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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The district court granted the Appellee, Lawrence Duane 
Christy, a stay of execution and held his federal habeas 
petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of a particular 
issue in state court. Arguing that the district court did not 
have the authority to hold the Appellee's habeas petition in 





On February 15, 1996, the Governor of Pennsylvania 
signed a warrant scheduling the Appellee's execution for 
March 12, 1996. Christy asked the district court for 
permission to proceed in forma pauperis, for counsel to be 
appointed to assist him in preparing a habeas petition and 
for a stay of his scheduled execution. On February 21, 
1996, the district court appointed new counsel and gave 
them ninety days to file a habeas petition on Christy's 
behalf. The district court also stayed Christy's execution 
date. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 2251; 
McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994). Counsel filed 
Christy's habeas petition on April 17, 1996. 
 
The day before Christy's petition was filed, the United 
States Supreme Court announced its decision in Cooper v. 
Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996). In Cooper, the Supreme 
Court held that a state violates a defendant's right to due 
process if it requires the defendant to bear the burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence his 
incompetency to stand trial. Id. Due no doubt to the 
diligence of counsel, Christy's habeas petition included a 
claim alleging that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
violated his constitutional rights under Cooper. 
 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania answered Christy's 
petition on July 16, 1996, and asserted that Christy had 
failed to exhaust his state court remedies for the purported 
Cooper error. On August 9, 1996, Christy asked the district 
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court to hold his habeas petition in abeyance while he 
returned to state court to exhaust his Cooper claim. Over 
the opposition of the Commonwealth, the district court 
granted the abeyance motion and also kept the stay of 
execution in effect while Christy proceeded in state court. 
The Commonwealth now appeals. This case presents a 
number of important questions, not the least of which is 





28 U.S.C. § 1291 usually limits our appellate jurisdiction 
to reviewing final decisions of the district courts. Martin v. 
Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1256 (3d Cir. 1996). A judgment is 
final only when there is a "decision by the district court 
that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for 
the court to do but execute the judgment." Bryant v. 
Stevens, 57 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Isador 
Paiewonsky and Assoc. v. Sharp Properties Inc., 998 F.2d 
145, 150 (3d Cir. 1993). In other words, a final order is one 
which leaves the district court with "nothing to do." See 
Farmer v. McDaniel, 98 F.3d 1548, 1552 (9th Cir. 1996). 
The dispositive inquiry is whether the order appealed from 
finally resolved the case below. See Presbytery of N.J. 
Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
 
The order appealed from here is not a final order. The 
district court ordered that "adjudication of the petition for 
writ of habeas corpus shall be held in abeyance pending his 
exhaustion of state court remedies" and that "the stay of 
execution entered by this court on February 21, 1996 be 
and hereby is continued in effect until further order of this 
court." Clearly, this order does not resolve the habeas case. 
It is not dispositive of any issue raised in Christy's habeas 
petition. The district court expressly indicates the transient 
nature of the order by indicating it will only remain in effect 
until "further order of this court." 
 
The Commonwealth tacitly agrees that this is not a final 
order by arguing that we have jurisdiction pursuant to the 
"collateral order" doctrine first announced in Cohen v. 
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Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221 
(1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court held that a "small 
class" of collateral orders are final and appealable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 even though they do not terminate the 
underlying litigation. 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S. Ct. at 1225-26. 
The case law on the collateral order doctrine is extensive 
and its requirements are clear. We can review a collateral 
order that (1) finally resolves a disputed question; (2) raises 
an important issue distinct from the merits of the case; and 
(3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from afinal 
judgment. Praxis Properties v. Colonial Sav. Bank SLA, 947 
F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1991); see also In re Ford Motor 
Company, 1997 WL 164190 (3d Cir. April 9, 1997). Failure 
to meet any of these requirements precludes a finding of 
appellate jurisdiction. United States v. Bertoli, 994 F.2d 
1002, 1012 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the 
collateral order doctrine as a "narrow exception" to the final 
judgment rule. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 
472 U.S. 424, 430, 105 S. Ct. 2757, 2760-61 (1985). We 
have followed this admonition and construed the doctrine 
narrowly "lest the exception swallow up the salutary 
general rule that only final orders be appealed." Yakowicz 
v. Pennsylvania, 683 F.2d 778 n.10 (3d Cir. 1982); see also 
Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A&Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 57 (3d 
Cir. 1993) ("We have followed the Supreme Court's 
admonition and have consistently construed the Cohen 
exception narrowly rather than expansively."). 
 
Moreover, strict construction of the collateral order 
doctrine is designed to further the longstanding 
congressional policy against piecemeal appeals which 
underlies the final judgment rule. See Lusardi v. Xerox 
Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1984).1 To guard against 
the temptation to expand the doctrine's reach, the Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Lusardi, we stated that the final judgment rule serves a number of 
purposes including the efficient administration of scarce judicial 
resources, maintenance of the appropriate relationship between the trial 
and appellate courts, and the protection of the judicial process and its 
participants from the delay which can prove advantageous to a well- 
financed litigant. 747 F.2d at 177 (citations omitted). 
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Court has instructed that the question of whether or not an 
order is immediately appealable should be decided for the 
entire category to which the order in question belongs. 
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 853, 
855, 114 S. Ct. 1992, 1994 (1994). Therefore, we now 
decide the question of whether an order which holds a 





To pass the first prong of the collateral order doctrine 
test, the order appealed from must "finally resolve a 
disputed question." Praxis Properties, 947 F.2d at 54. This 
inquiry has been labeled the "conclusiveness prong." Id. In 
determining whether an order "conclusively determines the 
disputed questions," the Supreme Court has contrasted two 
types of orders: those which are "inherently tentative" and 
those which are "technically amendable, but made with the 
expectation that they will be the final word on the subject 
addressed." See Gulfstream Aerospace v. Mayacamas Corp., 
485 U.S. 271, 277, 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1137 (1987). 
 
Although we are aware of no case that bears directly on 
the issue whether an order holding a habeas petition in 
abeyance is conclusive for purposes of the collateral order 
doctrine, we draw instruction from two Supreme Court 
cases addressing the question of whether an order granting 
a Colorado River stay2 is conclusive. In Moses H. Cone 
Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 
S. Ct. 927 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a district 
court order granting a Colorado River stay was expected to 
be the final word on the subject and thus satisfied the 
"conclusiveness" prong of Cohen. The Court reasoned that 
an order granting such a stay necessarily contemplated 
that the federal court will have nothing further to do in 
resolution of any substantive part of the case because a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 
800, 96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976), the Supreme Court held that in "exceptional 
circumstances," a federal district court may stay or dismiss an action 
solely because of the pendency of similar litigation in state court. 424 
U.S. at 818, 96 S. Ct. at 1246. 
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district court can invoke Colorado River only if it first 
determines that the parallel state proceeding will be an 
adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of 
the issues between the parties. 460 U.S. at 28, 103 S. Ct. 
at 943. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that such an 
order meant that the district court had no reason to 
reconsider its decision. 
 
In contrast to the Cone decision, the Supreme Court has 
held that an order denying a Colorado River stay is 
"inherently tentative." In Gulfstream Aerospace, the Court 
explained that a district court usually will revisit and 
reassess an order denying a Colorado River stay in light of 
subsequent events that occur during the course of the 
litigation. 485 U.S. at 278, 108 S. Ct. at 1137-38 (citations 
omitted). If an order is not entered "with the expectation 
that it will be the final word on the subject addressed," it 
is not immediately appealable. Id. We believe that the order 
appealed from here is more akin to type of order appealed 
from in the Cone case. The reasoning of Cone and 
Gulfstream Aerospace is helpful here, at least by analogy. 
The determination in those cases of conclusiveness of the 
stay order effectively turned on whether a "revision [of the 
order] might reasonably be expected in the ordinary course 
of the litigation." Cone, 460 U.S. at 12 n.14, 103 S. Ct. at 
935 n. 14. 
 
At all events, the issue before us on appeal is a discrete 
legal question -- whether the district court may properly 
hold a habeas appeal in abeyance while a petitioner 
exhausts certain claims in state court. The order appealed 
from herein resolves that question in the affirmative. 
Christy argues that the district court's order holding his 
habeas petition in abeyance and staying his execution was 
"inherently tentative." Christy reasons that the district 
court's order was not made with the expectation that it will 
be the final word on the subject addressed. Christy 
misconstrues the first prong of Cohen. Although the district 
court's order may not have been the final word on the 
merits of the habeas petition, it did conclusively determine 
the discreet legal question that is the subject of this appeal. 
See Praxis Properties, 947 F.2d at 56. Having determined 
that it may exercise such authority over an unexhausted 
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habeas petition, we cannot perceive of any circumstances 
in which the district court would revisit the question. 
Because the district court undoubtedly expected that its 
order would resolve the question of whether it may hold an 
unexhausted habeas petition in abeyance, we conclude that 





The Commonwealth maintains that the district court's 
order holding Christy's habeas petition in abeyance 
"resolves an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action." Christy submits that the order 
appealed from merely deferred resolution of the petition and 
did not resolve any important issue. The Supreme Court 
has instructed that the "importance of the right asserted 
has always been a significant part of [the] collateral order 
doctrine." Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 504, 
109 S. Ct. 1976, 1980 (1989). Therefore, we must assure 
ourselves that the issue presented herein is important 
enough to merit immediate appeal. See Praxis Properties, 
947 F.2d at 56. 
 
We have held that the "importance/separateness prong" 
of Cohen contemplates orders that are important in a 
jurisprudential sense. See Praxis Properties, 947 F.2d at 56 
(citing Nemours Found. v. Manganaro Corp., 878 F.2d 98, 
100 (3d Cir. 1989)). The question whether a district court 
may hold an unexhausted habeas petition in abeyance 
pending resolution in state court of certain claims remains 
unsettled. While some of our district courts have found 
such authority, See Beasley v. Fulcomer, No. 90-4711, 1991 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5408 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1991); Edwards v. 
Horn, No. 1:CV-95-1876 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1996), Szuchon 
v. Lehman, No. 94-195E (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 1995), another 
circuit has determined that district courts lack the 
authority to hold such petitions in abeyance, Victor v. 
Hopkins, 90 F.3d 276 (8th Cir. 1996). Given the important 
nature of capital habeas cases in general, we conclude that 
this appeal presents an issue that is "important enough in 
a jurisprudential sense to require an immediate 
 
                                8 
interlocutory appeal." Nemours Foundation, 878 F.2d at 
101. 
 
In addition to determining whether this appeal presents 
an "important" issue, we also must decide whether the 
order appealed from is separate from the merits of the 
underlying action. This "separateness" requirement derives 
from the policy against piecemeal appeals. Cone, 460 U.S. 
at 12 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 945 n.13 (citations omitted). We 
do not believe that the order appealed from here involves 
"considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal 
issues comprising the [petitioner's] cause of action." 
Coopers and Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469, 98 S. 
Ct. 2454, 2458 (1978). The order appealed from and the 
precise legal issue it presents will not thrust us into the 
merits of the underlying habeas petition. Here, we are 
asked only to determine the propriety of a district court 
order which keeps an unexhausted habeas petition in 
abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to 
exhaust certain claims. Such a determination is sufficiently 
ancillary to the underlying action that we need not become 
"enmeshed" in the merits of the dispute. We therefore 
conclude that the order appealed from satisfies the 




Last, to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, 
an order must be such that review postponed will 
ultimately be review denied. See Praxis Properties, 947 F. 
2d at 58; Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 1988). 
An order is effectively unreviewable if the order involves "an 
asserted right the legal and practical value of which would 
be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." Lauro 
Lines, 490 U.S. at 499, 109 S. Ct. at 1978 (citations 
omitted). The Commonwealth argues that by permitting the 
petitioner to return to state court and exhaust particular 
issues, the order effectively destroys any appellate review of 
its appropriateness. We agree. If we do not review the 
matter at this juncture, the Petitioner will have returned to 
state court and exhausted his claims, thereby presenting 
the district court with an exhausted habeas petition and 
rendering the appropriateness of the district court's stay 
 
                                9 
and abeyance ruling unreviewable. We therefore find that 
the district court's order holding the habeas petition in 
abeyance is "effectively unreviewable" on appeal from a final 
judgment in this case. 
 
In summary, we find that the district court's order 
holding Christy's habeas petition in abeyance pending 
exhaustion of state court remedies satisfies all the 
requirements of the collateral order doctrine and, as such, 
is an appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. Having determined that we have the requisite 
jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of this appeal. Our 





28 U.S.C. § 2254 instructs a federal court to refuse a 
state prisoner's habeas petition unless "it appears that the 
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the 
courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). This 
"exhaustion requirement" is primarily grounded in the 
"respect which federal courts have for the state judicial 
processes and upon the administrative necessities of the 
federal judiciary." Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679, 68 S. 
Ct. 1270, 1274 (1948). In Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 
S. Ct. 1198 (1982), the Supreme Court applied these 
principles to a case which involved a "mixed" habeas 
petition -- a petition which contained both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims. The Court held that "because the rule 
requiring exhaustion of all claims furthers the purposes 
underlying the habeas statute . . . a district court must 
dismiss such `mixed petitions.' " Id. at 510, 102 S. Ct. at 
1199. The Court clearly warned habeas litigants: "[B]efore 
bringing any claims to federal court, be sure to first take 
each issue to the state court." Id. at 520, 102 S. Ct. at 
1204. However, this "total exhaustion" rule is not an 
inflexible barrier to federal court jurisdiction, but a rule of 
comity. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 468, 684, 104 S. 
Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). The Supreme Court has indicated 
that, although there is a strong presumption in favor of 
exhaustion, there are also "limited circumstances under 
which the failure [to exhaust] will not act as a complete bar 
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to federal habeas review." Pillette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d 494, 
496 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 
129, 107 S. Ct. 1671 (1987)). We recognize that in rare 
cases exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency may 
exist which permit a federal court to entertain an 
unexhausted claim. See Victor v. Hopkins, 90 F.3d 276, 279 
(8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 115 U.S. 241, 252, 
6 S. Ct. 734, 740-41 (1886)); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 
117, 64 S. Ct. 448, 451 (1944). The Supreme Court has 
instructed that federal courts are to "exercise discretion in 
each [habeas] case to decide whether the administration of 
justice would be better served by insisting on exhaustion or 
by reaching the merits of the petition forthwith." Granberry, 
481 U.S. at 131, 107 S. Ct. at 1673. Such circumstances 
exist when, for example, state remedies are inadequate or 
fail to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal 
contentions raised, or where exhaustion in state court 
would be "futile." Id.; see also Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 
53, 92 S. Ct. 174 (1971) (absent special circumstances, 
federal courts should dismiss habeas petitions which 
contain unexhausted claims). 
 
Christy and Amici argue that such "unusual 
circumstances" exist where the dismissal of a mixed 
petition creates a risk that the petitioner will be executed 
before his or her federal claims can be litigated in federal 
court. They submit that should his petition be dismissed, 
Christy will be without the protection of a federal stay and 
available to the Commonwealth for execution. We partly 
agree and would never knowingly permit Christy's 
execution while his federal constitutional claims are still 
being litigated. We caution, however, that the mere risk 
that Pennsylvania courts will not stay the execution cannot 
amount to an "unusual circumstance." The appropriate 
inquiry must be whether an execution is "imminent." In 
this case, Christy's original execution was scheduled for 
March 12, 1996. On February 21, 1996, the district court 
granted Christy a stay and gave newly appointed counsel 
ninety days to prepare and file a habeas petition. When 
Christy filed his habeas petition on April 18, 1996, his 
execution date had lapsed. His execution was no longer 
imminent because the original execution warrant had 
expired and no new warrant was ever issued. Pennsylvania 
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law requires the reissuance of the warrant upon vacation of 
the federal stay and also permits the Pennsylvania courts to 
grant another stay for post-conviction purposes upon a 
finding that "the petitioner makes a strong showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits." 42 Pa.C.S.A. 
§ 9545(c)(2). Moreover, in this case, the Office of the 
General Counsel to the Governor of Pennsylvania has 
assured us via letter submitted March 19, 1997, that 
Christy will not be executed during the pendency of this 
new round of post-conviction proceedings. Syndi L. Guido, 
Deputy General Counsel to the Governor, indicated that 
"warrants are not signed while litigation is pending or 
during any unexpired appeal period." 
 
To excuse exhaustion and grant a stay and abeyance 
motion, the proper inquiry must be whether an execution is 
"imminent." In deciding whether to grant a "stay and 
abeyance" motion or whether to review a mixed petition, 
district courts must focus not on the risk but on the 
actuality that state courts will refuse to stay an execution 
while federal claims are pending. If a state court has 
refused to grant a stay pending its adjudication of a 
prisoner's federal constitutional claims, such action by the 
district court would be appropriate. 
 
We do not think Christy has demonstrated the 
"imminent" nature of his execution. Neither side has 
presented us with any evidence that the Commonwealth 
would countenance the execution of a prisoner in Christy's 
circumstances. Therefore, Christy has not demonstrated 
"one of those rare cases where exceptional circumstances of 
peculiar urgency are shown to exist," permitting us to 
disregard the exhaustion requirement. See United States ex 
rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We point out that the Commonwealth may waive exhaustion of the 
Cooper claim, thereby permitting the district court to review the petition 
as filed. The district court is not required, however, to accept a waiver 
and may require state court exhaustion. See Thompson v. Wainwright, 
714 F.2d 1495, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1983); Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 
958, 970 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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IV. 
 
Because execution is no longer imminent in this case, we 
will remand to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss. The district court's dismissal raises a question of 
whether any subsequent habeas filings on Christy's behalf 
will be considered "successive" and whether, pursuant to 
the dictates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, Title I, § 106, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1220-21 (1996) [hereinafter "AEDPA"], Christy 
would be required to seek authorization from the court to 
file a petition for habeas corpus. We hold that when a prior 
petition has been dismissed without prejudice for failure to 
exhaust state remedies, no such authorization is necessary 
and the petitioner may file his petition in the district court 
as if it were the first such filing. 
 
Section 6 of the AEDPA amends 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to 
forbid any "second or successive" petition for collateral 
relief without the consent of the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(b)(3)(E). The AEDPA instructs courts of appeals to 
grant this authorization only if the applicant makes a prima 
facie showing that the application satisfies the 
requirements for second or successive applications. 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). While the AEDPA requires this 
procedure for second or successive application, it does not 
define what is meant by "second" or "successive." 
 
Before the AEDPA amendments took effect, a petition 
filed after a previously submitted petition was dismissed 
without prejudice was not considered an abuse of the writ. 
See e.g. Woods v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 321, 322 n.1 (5th Cir. 
1991); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 
1989); Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 168 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1996). The abuse 
of the writ doctrine is deeply rooted in the need for finality 
and the concerns of comity. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 
U.S. 467, 491-92, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991). The 
problems that the abuse of the writ doctrine seeks to avoid 
are not implicated when a petition is filed after a prior 
petition is dismissed for lack of exhaustion. See Sanders v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 1078 (1963) 
(holding that the doctrine of writ abuse is not implicated if 
"the same ground was earlier presented but not adjudicated 
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on the merits"). Moreover, as one court has observed, 
"dismissal without prejudice of an entire petition -- 
including exhausted claims -- for failure to exhaust certain 
claims promotes the policies underlying the doctrine." 
Camarano, 98 F.3d at 46. Such a dismissal serves the 
interests of finality by discouraging piecemeal litigation. Id. 
Additionally, encouraging exhaustion promotes harmony 
between the federal and state judicial systems by giving the 
state courts the first opportunity to review state convictions 




We will vacate and remanded to the district court with 
instructions for it to dismiss the petition. 
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